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WHEN LOSSES ARE TOO BIG: EVALUATING 
THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN 
CALIFORNIA† 
John T. Nockleby* 
          The pure economic loss doctrine is a rule developed by common 
law courts to shield a defendant from exposure to negligence suits where 
a party has not suffered physical injury or property damage, and the only 
losses someone suffers are economic in nature—such as lost profits or 
wages. Most recently, the California Supreme Court evaluated whether 
the doctrine should be applied in a case involving a massive 
environmental disaster, holding that the doctrine shielded a utility from 
liability for the economic losses to neighboring businesses caused by its 
putative negligence. 
          In October of 2015, a huge underground natural gas storage 
facility operated by Southern California Gas Company suffered a 
breathtaking blowout. Over a four-month period until the leak was 
capped, the facility blew 100,000 tons of natural gas into the atmosphere 
and surrounding communities. Public health officials directed the utility 
to evacuate nearly 15,000 residents within a five-mile radius of the 
storage facility. Numerous signs indicated Southern California Gas 
Company was not only negligent, but potentially grossly negligent in 
removing or failing to install safety valves on the injection wells and 
having no system in place to monitor several failing wellheads. 
Businesses within the evacuation zone that saw their revenues plummet 
brought suit against the company seeking recovery of the economic 
losses they suffered as a result of the evacuation. 
This Article evaluates the California Supreme Court’s decision, 
recognizing the worries that court and others have expressed concerning 
how to limit a cascade of economic losses stemming from potentially 
minor acts of negligence. However, the Article argues that a rule that 
might be justified in particular contexts (e.g., an automobile accident in 
 
 † Reviewing Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019). Disclosure: I 
helped organize a group of California tort law professors to file an amicus brief in the California 
Supreme Court. See Application for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioners; 
Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae California Tort Law Professors, Southern California Gas Leak 
Cases, 441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019) (No. S246669), 2018 WL 4277779. 
 * Professor of Law and Director, Civil Justice Program, Loyola Law School. 
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a tunnel that might hold up thousands of commuters) should not apply to 
the destruction following enormous environmental disasters, where a 
single grossly negligent defendant might destroy the livelihoods of entire 
communities as well as the natural environment.  
          While critiquing the decision on moral, economic, and pragmatic 
grounds, the Article evaluates many leading cases to suggest how lines 
allowing recovery in special settings would not threaten undue liability. 
The Article argues that the economic loss rule should not apply in 
instances of massive environmental disasters, where significant losses 
suffered by nearby enterprises can be readily identified, and the number 
of potential claimants can be limited—such as here, where the five-mile 
zone during the four month evacuation period provides a ready, 
ascertainable limit on who might be able to claim their economic losses 
and for a limited period of time. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: AN ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER 
In October of 2015, residents in the Porter Ranch community near 
Los Angeles discovered the pungent odor of natural gas in their 
neighborhoods.1 What turned out to be an enormous natural gas 
blowout from a storage facility spread an “oily mist” throughout the 
community.2 Thousands of residents suffered headaches, dizziness, 
and acute respiratory and central nervous system disorders.3 Students 
at local schools complained of nosebleeds and vomiting.4 
The leak was long-lasting and intense, and it took nearly four 
months to cap the source.5 At its peak, the facility emitted fifty-five 
tons of natural gas every hour.6 By the time the leak was controlled, it 
had set loose about 100,000 tons of natural gas, “releasing enough 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere to erase several years’ worth of 
efforts to combat climate change in California.”7 The blowout 
“spewed a volume of gas 220 times greater than the amount of oil 
released during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico.”8 The disaster has been described as the worst natural gas 
leak in United States history.9 
The leak had sprung from an underground reservoir called the 
Aliso Canyon Storage Facility, operated and maintained by Southern 
California Gas Company (“SoCalGas”).10 A depleted oil and gas field 
repurposed to store natural gas,11 the facility has enormous capacity: 
it can hold 80 billion cubic feet of natural gas some 8,500 feet below 
 
 1.  Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 119 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 
441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019). 
 2.  Id. 
 3. Id. at 130. 
 4. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881, 883 (Cal. 2019). 
 5.  Id. at 884. 
 6. Id. at 883.  
 7. Id. at 884. 
 8. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Demurrer of 
Defendants Southern California Gas Company and Sempra Energy to Second Amended 
Consolidated Master Class Action Business Complaint, Southern California Gas Leak Cases at 10, 
No. JCCP4861 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 8, 2017), 2017 WL 2361045.  
 9. Mark Chediak & Edvard Pettersson, Biggest U.S. Gas Leak Followed Years of Problems, 
State Says, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2019, 1:19 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2019-05-17/corrosion-led-to-worst-u-s-gas-leak-ever-and-there-were-others. 
 10. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 130 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 
441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019). 
 11. Background on Aliso Canyon and Actions to Date, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/CPUCNewsDetail.aspx?id=6442461346 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
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ground.12 SoCalGas adds to the facility during low usage months and, 
during seasons of demand, extracts it using 115 high-pressure 
injection and withdrawal wells.13 The reservoir extends below the 
community of Porter Ranch.14 
In response to the leaks, and the complaints of residents having 
dire health problems, the Los Angeles County Department of Public 
Health directed SoCalGas to relocate anyone within a five-mile radius 
of the storage facility.15 The Los Angeles County Board of Education 
followed by closing schools in the area for the remainder of the 2015–
2016 school year.16 
As a result of the evacuation order, approximately 15,000 Porter 
Ranch residents left their homes for several months.17 Not until 
February 18, 2016, nearly four months after the leak was discovered, 
were state officials able to report that the eruptions had been sealed 
off.18 In May 2016, the Department of Public Health directed 
SoCalGas to provide comprehensive remediation for residences 
within that five mile radius.19 
What caused the leak? According to subsequent filings and 
findings by government agencies, SoCalGas had been negligent in 
maintaining the facility.20 Among other defaults, SoCalGas was 
alleged by plaintiffs in the Southern California Gas Leak Cases21 to 
have removed or never installed safety valves on the injection wells.22 
One of the wells, known as Standard Senson 25, or SS-25, 
suffered a blowout, which is what led to the devastation of the Porter 
Ranch community, the spread of the natural gas, and dislocation of the 
residents.23 The SS-25 well—like the other wells tapping the field—
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.; see Petitioners’ Opening Brief on the Merits at 12, Southern California Gas Leak 
Cases, 441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019) (No. S246669), 2018 WL 3006424 at *12. The California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) maintains a website reporting on developments in the disaster. See 
Background on Aliso Canyon and Actions to Date, supra note 11. 
 14.  Petitioners’ Opening Brief on the Merits, supra note 13, at 12. 
 15.  Id. at 14. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 130 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 
441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019). 
 19.  Id. at 119. 
 20.  See Background on Aliso Canyon and Actions to Date, supra note 11. 
 21.  441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019). 
 22. Petitioners’ Opening Brief on the Merits, supra note 13, at 12–14. 
 23. Background on Aliso Canyon and Actions to Date, supra note 11. 
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contained both a seven-inch exterior casing and an interior tube.24 The 
exterior casing is typically filled with a brine.25 The interior tube is 
used to pump gas, so if it develops a leak, the exterior casing will 
contain the leak.26 In this case, plaintiffs alleged, SoCalGas used both 
the interior and exterior casing to inject and extract gas—all at high 
pressure.27 Further, they alleged that the company failed to cement the 
casing at the surface area, dramatically increasing the risk of 
corrosion.28 
Subsequent findings by the California Public Utility Commission 
(CPUC) buttress the plaintiffs’ claims in the Gas Leak Cases that 
SoCalGas negligently operated and maintained the blowout well.29 
The SS-25 well was drilled between October 1953 and 1954.30 
However, the original borehole was abandoned because a drill string 
and tools were lost in the hole.31 However, in 1973, SS-25 was 
converted to a gas storage well.32 The CPUC confirmed that SoCalGas 
used both the tubing and casing to inject and withdraw gas.33 Thus, 
according to the CPUC, the only barrier to the environment was the 
exterior casing.34 
The CPUC retained a consultant to evaluate SoCalGas operations 
at the Aliso Canyon field.35 The consultant found that the leak 
occurred because the outer seven-inch well casing ruptured due to 
corrosion.36 It also concluded that in the years prior to the SS-25 
blowout, SoCalGas had experienced over sixty casing leaks, but 
(amazingly) had not conducted detailed follow-up inspections or 
analyses.37 Indeed, the consultant found, “SoCalGas lacked any form 
of risk assessment,” and lacked any system to monitor their wells’ 
 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Petitioners’ Opening Brief on the Merits, supra note 13, at 13. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28. Id. at 12–13. 
 29.  See Background on Aliso Canyon and Actions to Date, supra note 11. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35.  Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Root Cause Analysis for Aliso Canyon Finalized; 
California to Continue Strengthening Safeguards for Natural Gas Storage Facilities 1 (May 17, 
2019), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M292/K947/292947433.pdf. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
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integrity.38 Over a two-year period, after assessments mandated by 
state officials, more than half of the wells were shut down; the rest 
have been approved as adequately secured.39 
Although the CPUC did not say so in describing its consultant’s 
report, the consultant’s conclusions would support a finding that 
SoCalGas had been grossly negligent in operating and maintaining the 
Aliso Canyon field. 
II.  THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS LEAK CASES 
What happens to local businesses when 15,000 residents located 
within a five-mile evacuation zone of a community are suddenly 
required to relocate because of a disaster caused by the negligence of 
a company? The businesses lose customers, and owners and their 
employees are themselves required to evacuate if they do not want to 
experience health problems. “The slump hit local gas stations, stores, 
realtors, daycare facilities, preschools, manicurists, fitness studios, 
pharmacies, restaurants, doctors, and [others].”40 
In Southern California Gas Leak Cases, seven small businesses 
located within the Porter Ranch evacuation zone filed a lawsuit against 
SoCalGas seeking lost profits for themselves and several hundred 
other businesses, covering their losses at least during the four months 
before the gas leak was stoppered.41 SoCalGas filed a demurrer on the 
grounds that it owed “no duty” to the plaintiffs to protect them from 
what it described as “purely economic losses.”42 
The pure economic loss doctrine is a rule developed by common 
law courts to shield a defendant from exposure to negligence suits 
where the only loss someone suffers is economic in nature.43 The 
doctrine has been employed in a number of separate contexts, and no 
small amount of confusion has resulted when courts and 
 
 38. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. 
 40. In re Coordination Proceedings Special Title Rule (3.550) Southern California Gas Leak 
CA., No. JCCP4861, 2017 WL 2361919, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 8, 2017). 
 41. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881, 884, 896 (Cal. 2019); Southern 
California Gas Leak Cases, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 119 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 
2019). 
 42. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d at 884.  
 43. Id. at 885. The California Supreme Court employed that term “as a shorthand for 
‘pecuniary or commercial loss that does not arise from actionable physical, emotional or 
reputational injury to persons or physical injury to property.’” Id. (quoting Dan B. Dobbs, An 
Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 713 (2006)). 
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commentators have failed to distinguish between at least two of 
them.44 
The two contexts involve: (a) pre-existing relationships often 
reflected in contractual relationships, where the plaintiff is suing the 
defendant in negligence; and (b) stranger cases, where people suffer 
injury that is not implicated by a contractual relationship, and again 
the suit is based upon negligence. As will be apparent, the Gas Leak 
Cases involve only the second set, although the parties’ briefs and the 
California Court of Appeal’s decision comprehensively addressed 
both. 
A. Pre-Existing Relationships 
Where products or services subject to a contractual relationship 
are involved, courts have generally triggered the economic loss rule to 
restrict recovery by one of the parties involved in the transaction.45 
Consider the famous East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval, Inc.46 case, decided by the United States Supreme Court 
under admiralty law but influential as to products liability tort law. 
In Transamerica Delaval, a charterer of a ship propelled by 
turbines manufactured by Transamerica sued for loss of business when 
the turbines proved defective; lacking power, the ships were out of 
commission for months.47 The United States Supreme Court held that 
since the defective turbines damaged only themselves and not persons 
or other property, the charterers were barred from securing their 
 
 44. Here I follow the lead of Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick. 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, THE 
LAW OF TORTS §§ 607, 613, at 462–69, 479–84 (2d ed. 2011); see also Oscar S. Gray, Some 
Thoughts on “The Economic Loss Rule” and Apportionment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 897, 898 (2006) 
(arguing that there is no single “economic loss rule” but instead a “constellation of somewhat 
similar doctrines that tend to limit liability” that work differently in different contexts, for not 
necessarily identical reasons “with exceptions where the reasons for limiting liability were absent”); 
Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary–Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 523, 534–35 (2009).  
 45. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 44. 
 46. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). The Court thought that the doctrine was needed to prevent warranty 
law from “drown[ing] in a sea of tort.” Id. at 866. In its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that the 
law of product liability was based on the idea that injured persons should receive greater protection 
from dangerous products than is available through warranty law. Id. However, where a product 
defect results only in damaging itself, that is not the kind of harm that requires recovery in tort. Id. 
at 870–71. Where the only loss is to a product itself, a plaintiff’s loss is essentially the loss of the 
product; in the Court’s view a disappointed party’s expectations can be adequately managed 
through contract and warranty law. Id. 
 47.  Id. at 861. 
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economic losses through a negligence suit in tort.48 They could 
recover, if at all, only in contract.49 The doctrine was said to secure the 
boundary between contract and tort, limiting recovery to just contract 
damages when a product failed to perform as expected.50 
Similarly, California courts have wrestled with the economic loss 
doctrine involving pre-existing relationships. In Seely v. White Motor 
Co.,51 a consumer purchased a truck with defective brakes.52 The truck 
overturned and caused only damage to the truck.53 Plaintiff sued the 
manufacturer and the dealer for the property damage to the truck, the 
money he paid for the truck, and lost profits.54 The court held that 
contract law—including warranty—was the appropriate remedy when 
the claim is that a product does “not match his economic 
expectations,” while tort law would address physical injury to people 
or property other than damage to the product itself.55 
In Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp.,56 the California 
Supreme Court explained the rule as follows: “[W]here a purchaser’s 
expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is 
not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he 
has suffered only ‘economic’ losses.”57 For purposes of this rule, 
“economic losses” consist of “damages for inadequate value, costs of 
repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of 
profits—without any claim of personal injury or damages to other 
property.”58 
 
 48.  Id. at 875–76. 
 49.  See id. 
 50. Id. at 873; see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 44, at 546 (“The underlying purpose of the 
economic loss rule is to preserve the distinction between contract and tort theories in circumstances 
where both theories could apply.”). 
 51. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). 
 52.  Id. at 147. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 148. 
 55. For the “other property” analysis, see KB Home v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587 (Ct. 
App. 2003). An injured “component” may be defined as “other property” if it is “a sufficiently 
discrete element of the larger product that it is not reasonable to expect its failure invariably to 
damage other portions of the finished product.” Id. at 596; see Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 
1134–35 (Cal. 2000), superseded by statute on other grounds, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 722 (S.B. 
800) (West), as recognized in Rosen v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 70 P.3d 351, 356 (Cal. 2003). 
 56.  102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004). 
 57. Id. at 272 (alteration in original). 
 58. Id. at 273. 
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A similar version of the economic loss rule has also been applied 
to services contracts.59 According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
authors, one subcontractor on a project cannot sue another 
subcontractor for economic losses caused by the other’s negligent 
delay in completing the project.60 However, where a contractor’s 
negligence is claimed to have caused harm to portions of the property 
not part of the contract, the plaintiff has alleged a duty independent of 
any contract and may maintain the suit.61 
Even in pre-existing contractual relationship cases, the California 
Supreme Court has developed an important exception, termed a 
“special relationship,” which is potentially available to persons not in 
contractual privity.62 The existence of a special relationship depends 
on balancing six factors: (1) the extent to which the transaction was 
intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) 
the proximity of connection between the conduct and the injury; (5) 
the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct; and (6) the policy 
of preventing similar future harm.63 
What is generally meant by the term “special relationship,” is that 
the plaintiff’s interest was contemplated by the contracting parties, 
although not specifically addressed in the contract. For instance, if a 
lawyer drafts a will, the beneficiary is not a party to the transaction but 
 
 59. 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 44, § 615 at 493–95. 
 60. The Restatement (Third) of Torts authors explain: 
A subcontractor’s negligence in either case is viewed just as a failure in the performance 
of its obligations to its contractual partner, not as the breach of a duty in tort to other 
subcontractors on the same job, or to the owner of the project . . . . General rules are 
favored in this area of the law . . . because their clarity allows parties to do business on 
a surer footing. In this setting, a rule of no liability is made especially attractive by the 
number and intricacy of the contracts that define the responsibilities of subcontractors 
on many construction projects. That web of contracts would be disrupted by tort suits 
between subcontractors or suits brought against them by a project’s owner. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014). 
 61. See Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 274 n.7 (citing Jimenez v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 
450 (Cal. 2002)). 
 62. J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979) (finding a special relationship 
between a restaurant operator and a contractor hired by the property owner to renovate the space 
rented by the restaurant operator and allowing the operator to recover economic losses suffered 
because the contractor negligently failed to complete the work on time). 
 63. Id. at 63; Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (holding that the intended 
beneficiary of a will could recover against a notary whose negligence in preparing the will 
precluded the beneficiary’s devise). There is a further exception for fraud, or where one party 
intentionally breaches the contract. Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 274. 
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is surely harmed “economically” if the lawyer fails to execute the will 
properly.64 As the California Supreme Court put it, “[w]hat we mean 
by special relationship is that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary 
of a particular transaction but was harmed by the defendant’s 
negligence in carrying it out.”65 
Although the California Court of Appeal in the Gas Leak Cases 
devoted substantial attention to discussing pre-existing relationship 
cases, the concerns embodied by the economic loss doctrine in 
contractual situations (allowing parties to make their own contract 
relationships and preventing end-runs around contract damage 
limitations66) are not present in the Gas Leak Cases.67 Instead, 
different issues need to be taken account of. 
B. Stranger Cases 
A second context in which the pure economic loss rule has been 
applied concerns circumstances not involving pre-existing 
relationships. The second set of circumstances typically involves 
negligent behavior by a stranger that injures only the economic 
interests of a person. 
Consider an auto accident on a busy highway or tunnel caused by 
a negligent driver that holds up traffic for miles and delays many 
commuters.68 Those involved in the accident who are physically 
injured or whose property is damaged may sue for personal injuries 
and property loss, and may also generally recover economic losses 
 
 64. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689–90 (Cal. 1961) (involving a lawyer); Biakanja, 
320 P.2d at 18 (involving a non-lawyer, a notary). 
 65. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881, 887 (Cal. 2019). 
 66. See Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 275–76. 
 67. Total Renal Care, Inc. v. Childers Oil Co., 743 F. Supp. 2d 609, 619 (E.D. Ky. 2010) 
(“[The] central rationale of the economic loss rule loses its force when there is no contractual 
relationship between the parties.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 1513, 1536–38 (1985). The court also utilized this example to illustrate the economic loss 
doctrine. See Judge Kaufman’s example in Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co.: 
To anyone familiar with N.Y. traffic there can be no doubt that a foreseeable result of an 
accident in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during rush hour is that thousands of people 
will be delayed. A driver who negligently caused such an accident would certainly be 
held accountable to those physically injured in the crash. But we doubt that damages 
would be recoverable against the negligent driver in favor of truckers or contract carriers 
who suffered provable losses because of the delay or to the wage earner who was forced 
to ‘clock in’ an hour late. And yet it was surely foreseeable that among the many who 
would be delayed would be truckers and wage earners. 
Cargill, Inc. v. City of Buffalo (Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co.), 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 
1968). 
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such as lost pay or lost profits from business resulting from the driver’s 
negligence. However, under the economic loss rule, other drivers—
not physically injured nor suffering property damage—who are 
merely inconvenienced or who lose pay or profit because of the delay 
caused by the negligent driver, may not recover what are described as 
“pure economic losses.”69 
In this second setting, the economic loss rule functions not as a 
mechanism for policing the boundary between contract and tort, but 
instead as a way of limiting the running of damages. While the delayed 
drivers in the highway illustration have lost pay or profit and can link 
their losses to the closing of the highway, courts have found it 
impossible to construct limits on liability that seem defensible. They 
worry that a negligent driver could be held liable to a thousand or more 
delayed vehicle operators, with no apparent way to distinguish one 
plaintiff from another or to limit ever-expanding liability exceeding 
any sense of moral culpability on the part of the negligent motorist. 
Under circumstances such as these, the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts posits that purely economic losses “proliferate more easily than 
losses of other kinds” and “are not self-limiting” in the same way that 
personal injuries or property damages are.70 Allowing recovery for 
such economic losses suffered by the delayed motorists create 
“liabilities that are indeterminate and out of proportion to [a 
defendant’s] culpability” and, with those liabilities, “exaggerated 
pressure to avoid an activity altogether.”71 
However, do the circumstances raised by the SoCalGas blowout 
create the same concerns when applied to the four hundred businesses 
in the evacuation zone? 
III.  THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECISION 
In response to the plaintiffs’ complaint charging the operator of 
the Aliso Canyon Storage Facility with negligence in operations and 
maintenance, SoCalGas filed a demurrer arguing that the economic 
loss rule barred the action.72 Such a motion entails arguing that 
SoCalGas owed no duty to the plaintiff businesses to avoid creating 
 
 69. See Rabin, supra note 68, at 1513, 1536–38. 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 1 cmt. c(1) (AM. 
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012).  
 71. Id. 
 72. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881, 884 (Cal. 2019).  
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risks that impose pure economic losses on them, or anyone else for 
that matter. 
But why is this a question of duty? Why a question of duty rather 
than a question, for example, of damages (you owe a duty to avoid 
exposing others to loss, but economic damages are excluded where the 
only damage suffered is economic in nature) or proximate cause (you 
owe a duty, but recovery for pure economic losses may be restricted 
because they are too remote from the defendant’s negligent act)?73 
One possibility for why courts may treat pure economic loss as a 
question of duty rather than under a different doctrinal category is that 
they may see economic losses as not “truly” legal injury. If whatever 
losses the businesses in the evacuation zone suffer are not “harms,” 
then it makes sense to cut off analysis at the earliest analytical 
opportunity—that is, to say SoCalGas owes no duty to avoid 
negligently imposing pure economic losses on its neighbors because 
those are not true harms.74 
But that is not how courts generally see the issue. If economic 
losses are associated with personal injury or property damage, they are 
clearly recoverable by the injured person. Additionally, many other 
torts (e.g., interference with contract, fraud, misrepresentation, slander 
of title, product disparagement, attorney malpractice) allow recovery 
for pure economic loss.75 So, even though the consequence of treating 
the problem at hand as a duty question means that, in fact, SoCalGas 
owes no duty to avoid negligently inflicting pure economic losses on 
its neighbors, it is not because the businesses’ lost profits are not true 
injuries. 
Instead, the likely answer to why courts treat economic losses 
under a duty analysis lies in the fact that deciding the question at the 
level of duty, rather than types of damage or proximate cause, keeps 
the analysis squarely in the hands of judges who have the power to 
 
 73. See Gray, supra note 44, at 900–01 (“Surely in principle we owe foreseeable victims of 
our negligence a duty of care—in the sense that we ought to exercise reasonable care toward them—
regardless of how we may explain our non-liability to unforeseeable victims and regardless of any 
countervailing considerations we may accept as limitations of our liability for harm caused by our 
breach of that duty of care.”). 
 74. An analysis of the nature of harm and injury is beyond the scope of this Article. See JULES 
L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY 35 (2001). 
 75.  Indeed, the principle harm rectified by these torts is the economic loss suffered by the 
injured person. 
(8) 53.2_NOCKLEBY (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020  12:40 PM 
422 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:409 
dismiss the lawsuit at the complaint stage.76 Whether an enterprise 
owes a duty to someone to avoid injuring them is a question of law.77 
If a defendant owes “no duty” to avoid injuring someone, lawsuits are 
subjected to early dismissal for failure to state a claim (achieved 
procedurally in California through a defendant’s demurrer).78 If an 
enterprise owes you no duty to avoid injuring you in a particular way, 
there is no point in conducting a trial, or even allowing discovery. 
However, suppose the court in the Gas Leak Cases had instead 
approached the question as one of proximate causation instead of duty. 
Then, the defendant would owe a duty and the question would rise to 
whether the economic losses suffered by these businesses were 
proximately caused by the defendants’ negligence. A causation 
analysis would expose a number of steps involved in deciding the 
question of ultimate liability: 
1. But for SoCalGas’s negligence, the gas would not have 
erupted from the SS-25 well casing; 
2. But for the blowout, the government authorities would not 
have declared an emergency evacuation within a five-mile 
zone for four months; 
3. But for the emergency evacuation, 15,000 residents would not 
have removed themselves from the business district; 
4. But for the departure of the 15,000 residents for the four-
month-long period of the evacuation, these businesses would 
not have lost significant income; and  
5. Whatever income was lost could be clearly linked to the 
blowout and the evacuation, and not a result of some other 
development. 
 
 76. That is because duty questions are questions of law to be decided by judges. Prior to Justice 
Cardozo’s decision in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), Professor 
Mark Geistfeld points out that the common law denied recovery for stand-alone emotional damages 
because they were thought to be too “remote” and not proximately caused by defendant’s 
negligence. See Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty: Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of 
Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1921, 1934 (2002); see also Francis H. Bohlen, Right to Recover 
for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 50 U. PA. L. REV. 141, 146 (1902). Geistfeld 
notes that a similar approach was followed when courts limited recovery for pure economic loss. 
Geistfeld, supra, at 1936; see, e.g., JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 170 n.50 (5th ed. 1977). 
 77. E.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 171 (Cal. 1993). 
 78. See, e.g., Adams v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 216, 220 (Ct. App. 1975) 
(“[A]ppellate determinations of the duty-of-care issue become crystallized as rules of law and hence 
as precedents.”), disapproved on other grounds by J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 
1979). 
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Looked at this way, a causation analysis may help illuminate why a 
duty analysis is attractive. The number of steps in the chain of 
causation that run from the gas eruption to business loss is not 
necessarily obvious, and subjects those losses to the argument that 
they are too remote or disconnected from the underlying tort.79 It is so 
much simpler for a judge to rule that economic losses are not 
recoverable at all (“no duty”) rather than to have to evaluate 
distinctions among claimants based upon degrees of remoteness. 
Nonetheless, several European jurisdictions that allow for 
recovery of pure economic loss would examine each of the causal links 
listed above and ask whether the business losses were too remote from 
the underlying negligence of the defendants.80 Indeed, if the court here 
had evaluated the problem using proximate causation analysis, the 
nature of the difficulty with allowing recovery might have been 
clarified. Under my approach, which would allow recovery to these 
businesses, the plaintiffs would be required to establish clear causal 
links even to arrive at a plausible measure of damage. 
A further, practical problem with a duty-based analysis is that 
important facts may not have been developed through discovery. A 
court employing a duty analysis decides cases in the abstract. Yes, the 
particular facts of “what happened here” are recounted as best as the 
plaintiff can describe them at the stage of a complaint prior to a full 
investigation, but what truly matters in a duty analysis is that the 
abstract evaluation of the general problem is divorced from the reality 
on the ground. 
In any event, the trial court judge in this case, John Shepard Wiley 
Jr., overruled SoCalGas’s demurrer, setting the stage for an appeal.81 
The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the demurrer 
should have been granted to dismiss the plaintiffs’ negligence 
 
 79. In addition, revising the pure economic loss rule to allow the claimants here to recover 
opens the door to a different problem: proliferating plaintiffs beyond the initial claimant. For 
example, those enterprises who sell to the businesses within the evacuation zone presumably also 
lost business opportunities, so any defense of recovery of pure economic losses will need to 
establish some limiting principle that explains why those who sell to the businesses in the 
evacuation zone should not also be able to recover. I address these concerns in Parts III(C) and IV, 
infra. 
 80. See supra notes 74, 76. See generally PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN EUROPE (Mauro Bussani 
& Vernon Palmer, eds., 2003) (addressing, particularly Chapter 7, a series of hypothetical 
circumstances addressing how thirteen European countries would evaluate particular types of 
economic losses). 
 81. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 119 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 
441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019). 
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claims.82 The California Supreme Court granted review and, in an 
opinion by Associate Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, affirmed the 
California Court of Appeal’s decision.83 Although in my view the 
court failed to recognize the downside implications of its decision, the 
opinion will no doubt be hailed as an endorsement of an unfortunate 
doctrine when applied to restrict recovery by businesses located within 
the ambit of environmental disasters. 
The California Supreme Court’s analysis can be boiled down to 
three distinct propositions. 
A. No Special Relationship 
First, the court noted that no special relationship existed between 
the business owners and SoCalGas.84 The court stated:  
[Prior decisions] cut[] sharply against imposing a duty of 
care to avoid causing purely economic losses in negligence 
cases like this one: where purely economic losses flow not 
from a financial transaction meant to benefit the plaintiff 
(and which is later botched by the defendant), but instead 
from an industrial accident caused by the defendant (and 
which happens to occur near the plaintiff).85 
Analytically, this argument is beside the point. The pre-existing 
relationship cases (where the court has nonetheless created important 
exceptions) are based on the idea that both contracting parties should 
be reliant on contract remedies if a problem in performance arises. 
Since the parties have voluntarily entered into a relationship with each 
other, the underlying theory is that they have the possibility that they 
could have addressed the issue during their negotiation.86 Courts 
worry about “contract drown[ing] in a sea of tort.”87 Additionally, 
when others within the ambit of contractual performance are injured, 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019).  
 84. Id. at 892.  
 85. Id. at 889. 
 86. I am not offering a view on the pre-contractual opportunities that contracting parties may 
have to anticipate performance or product defects, but merely intending to distinguish that setting 
from the stranger cases, which from my perspective provide a much stronger basis for allowing 
economic losses to be recognized. 
 87. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986); see Mark A. 
Geistfeld, The Contractually Based Economic Loss Rule in Tort Law: Endangered Consumers and 
the Error of East River Steamship, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2016). 
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courts have often expanded liability under the “special relationship” 
doctrine.88 
However, it would be a rare case in the stranger setting where a 
negligent party and the disaster victim have previously formed or 
anticipated a “special relationship.” Courts should not look for, or 
expect to find such a relationship. Seeking a “special relationship” 
under such circumstances is akin to expecting to find that the driver 
who backed into your car in the grocery store parking lot happened to 
know you in high school. The “relationship” is irrelevant to the nature 
of the problem. 
Moreover, why should a doctrine developed in the pre-existing 
relationship context—where both participants have at least some 
capacity to recognize the limitations and potential risks of engaging 
the other party—support an argument against recognizing economic 
harm in stranger cases? No one subject to an environmental, social, 
and economic disaster as occurred here hopes to have a pre-existing 
special “relationship” with the party who caused the disaster. 
Indeed, the existence of a pre-existing relationship offers a 
weaker basis for recovery than when a stranger causes harm. 89 In the 
stranger setting, there is no capacity for a victim to choose his 
transgressor—no opportunity for self-help or to avoid dealing with a 
potentially bad actor. At least in moral theory, the stranger case setting 
would implicate a stronger rationale for recognizing economic losses. 
B. Liability Disproportionate to SoCalGas’s Fault 
Second, the Gas Leak Cases court worried about imposing 
liability out of proportion to the fault of the defendant.90 However, in 
such a case as SoCalGas—in which the utility’s gross negligence in 
managing the Aliso Canyon Storage Facility created the largest gas 
disaster in the history of the country and unilaterally destroyed years 
 
 88. See 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 44, § 615 at 490, 494–95. 
 89. The California Supreme Court has gradually extended the obligations of parties whose 
negligence in performing contracts injures others outside the contractual relationship. In the parallel 
context of auditor liability to businesses who relied on a negligently-prepared audit report, the court 
held that, in addition to the client who commissioned the report, an additional “narrow class of 
persons who . . . may reasonably come to receive and rely on an audit report [may recover on a 
theory of negligent misrepresentation] . . . . Such persons are specifically intended beneficiaries of 
the audit report who are known to the auditor and for whose benefit it renders the audit report.” 
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 767 (Cal. 1992). 
 90. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d at 891–92 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 1 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2012)). 
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of California’s efforts to fight climate change—it seems odd, if not 
aberrant, to raise the specter of disproportionate liability. If any 
company is morally blameworthy for its part in destroying the planet 
and decimating the businesses of an entire community, surely 
SoCalGas shares responsibility. 
As our society has dramatically changed over the decades, courts 
should be open to reconsidering dated common law doctrines, or even 
recent common law doctrines that disguise injustice in the language of 
law and economic euphemisms such as “overdeterrence.” When 
corporate entities managing potentially devastating technologies and 
materials create such social and environmental destruction as here, 
liability-limiting doctrines like the economic loss rule should be 
reconsidered. 
It is not just the storage of natural gas that is at issue. 
Groundwaters polluted by hazardous chemicals,91 oil spills that wreak 
havoc in the ocean and on hundreds of miles of coastline,92 and other 
great hazards93—many enterprises escape full responsibility for the 
environmental and human disasters they create. 
Allocating full responsibility to grossly negligent parties for the 
environmental and economic destruction they impose on communities 
and the earth may not ever be fully possible, but promulgating a rule 
that arbitrarily limits liability solely to those who have suffered 
personal injury or damage to tangible property does not come close to 
recognizing the true cost of activities that contaminate the earth and 
destroy—at least for a time—the economic life of entire communities. 
While fish in the ocean and birds in the air have no standing as they 
 
 91. See, e.g., Bruce Finley, Colorado Ramps up Response to Toxic “Forever Chemicals” After 
Discovery of Hot Spots Across Metro Denver, DENV. POST (Sept. 10, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/09/10/pfas-chemical-contamination-denver-colorado/; These 
Chemicals Are Forever: Water Contamination from PFOA, PFOS, and Other PFAS, FOOD & 
WATER WATCH, https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight/these-chemicals-are-forever-water-
contamination-pfoa-pfos-and-other-pfas (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
 92. See, e.g., Hannah Waters, The Oil Spill, Two Years Later, SMITHSONIAN: OCEAN (April 
2012), https://ocean.si.edu/ocean-life/oil-spill-two-years-later. 
 93. E.g., William Powell, Remember Times Beach: The Dioxin Disaster, 30 Years Later, ST. 
LOUIS MAG. (Dec. 3, 2012, 1:13 PM), https://www.stlmag.com/Remember-Times-Beach-The-
Dioxin-Disaster-30-Years-Later/; see Carl B. Meyer, The Environmental Fate of Toxic Wastes, 
the Certainty of Harm, Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regulation, 19 ENVTL. L. 321, 328–30 (1988) 
(discussing toxic waste’s growth). 
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are not “owned,” we have available proxies for at least some of these 
economic and social losses.94 
The foremost priority should be to repair the environmental 
damage. Here, the responsible governmental agencies (federal, state, 
and local) have imposed some of the costs of the environmental harms 
on SoCalGas, but they have not imposed the full costs of the disaster. 
In the absence of remedial measures addressing SoCalGas’s 
responsibility for increasing global warming (among other 
environmental disasters), allocating responsibility for losses imposed 
on neighboring businesses provides a limited proxy for the huge losses 
that would otherwise be borne by the larger society.  
In addition, where an entire community of over 15,000 people 
must evacuate their homes because of the gross negligence of a utility 
in deliberately ignoring safety protocols, are the “true” costs that 
enterprise imposes on a community reflected solely in damaged lungs 
and injury to tangible property? Is it truly “disproportionate” to assign 
liability to the utility for upending investment and income 
expectations for ongoing economic activity? Or, should courts require 
such utilities to reimburse local businesses that suffer complete loss of 
commerce during the period of a major evacuation caused by the 
utility? 
In addition to the moral claims identified here, there is also an 
economic component to the analysis. In his opinion, Justice Cuéllar 
worried about “the dangers of indeterminate liability, over-deterrence, 
and endless litigation.”95 But when a utility creates social and 
economic dislocation and foments environmental disaster, setting 
climate reduction goals back by several years, is there truly a risk of 
“overdeterrence”?96 Where an enterprise can be shown to have harmed 
 
 94. In the wake of economic and ecological devastation wrought by oil spills such as the 
Exxon Valdez disaster and the BP Gulf Oil spill, both Congress and California enacted statutes 
allowing businesses that depend on fisheries and use the natural environment in their businesses to 
recover their economic losses. See Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. (2012); Lempert-
Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8670.1 et seq. 
(West 2012). 
 95. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d at 894. 
 96. Jules Coleman offers a critique of an economic analysis that assigns victims of others’ 
wrongs to pay for their own losses: 
From an economic perspective, one ought to avoid all and only those accidents that could 
be prevented by incurring cost-justified precautions. Accidents that can be prevented 
only by taking precautions that are themselves more costly than the accidents themselves 
ought not to be prevented. That means that the costs of those accidents will fall on 
victims . . . . In that case, arguably, the costs of pursuing optimal deterrence are falling 
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a business community through its gross negligence, a theoretical 
worry of “overdeterrence” to justify the denial of recovery for business 
losses simply ignores the economic devastation reflected in this case. 
For decades, judges and scholars have seen the merit of requiring 
enterprises to bear the true “costs of accidents.”97 Forcing responsible 
corporations to internalize costs of accidents they cause incentivizes 
such enterprises to take careful stock of all the risks their activities 
generate. Placing the costs of accidents, such as rectifying pollution, 
onto the cost structures of these enterprises creates an economic 
incentive to manage risk and secure better ways to minimize, and 
perhaps even eliminate, the costs of repairing the environment and 
surrounding communities in the future. The enterprises that manage 
dangerous devices and technologies have the knowledge and expertise 
to control the hazards—or can acquire it. Liability for economic losses 
as well as personal injury and property damage provides the necessary 
spur to manage all the risks.98 
By holding that SoCalGas owes “no duty” to avoid negligently 
inflicting economic losses on neighboring businesses, the court here 
reversed the incentive structure.99 Rather than forcing SoCalGas to 
take sufficient precautions knowing it may have to stand for 
extraordinary losses, the “no duty” result directs SoCalGas instead to 
ignore those losses in undertaking its evaluation of the necessary 
precautions. 
However, if SoCalGas was required to internalize the losses 
suffered by neighboring businesses, a further felicitous distributional 
consequence would result: the enterprise that has control of the 
dangerous activity pays for a greater portion of the cost of the 
disaster.100 To the degree that an enterprise can thereafter distribute 
 
unfairly-or at least, disproportionately-on victims. Why ought victims to be conscripted 
in this way? 
Jules Coleman, The Costs of The Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 337, 345 (2008). 
 97. E.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970). 
 98. See COLEMAN, supra note 74, at 23 (“If the law is to provide the desired incentives, then 
injurers must face the full social costs of their conduct, not just the costs that might befall those to 
whom the injurers had a specific duty of care.”). 
 99. Judge Calabresi speculates that this outcome may stem from a “collective” decision to 
encourage such interference. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW & ECONOMICS 121 (2016). 
However, since judges make the decision under a “no duty” analysis, it is difficult to see how 
rejecting recovery of pure economic loss results from a collective democratic process. 
 100. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of 
Tort Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 147–48 (2011) (“Consequently, courts could have formulated 
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the cost to its customers, the customers who benefit from the 
underlying activity—here, the storage and distribution of natural 
gas—would pay marginally higher rates. In short, the beneficiaries of 
the activity would bear the losses resulting from the hazards of the 
activity. 
In the Gas Leak Cases, the California Supreme Court short-
circuited this possibility. The businesses within the evacuation zone 
suffered greatly during the four months the community was evacuated 
until the gas leak was capped; yet, according to the court, SoCalGas 
owed “no duty” to avoid destroying these businesses. 
C. Imposing Liability Creates Line-Drawing Problems 
Third, the court feared that “imposing such a duty would 
nevertheless create line-drawing problems across—quite literally—
space and time.”101 And further: “We see no workable way to limit 
geographically who may recover purely economic losses. Without 
one, the dangers of indeterminate liability, over-deterrence, and 
endless litigation are at their apex.”102 Line-drawing problems are 
endemic to law, but the administrative difficulty of drawing them 
should not prevent a court from recognizing that the call of justice 
requires the effort.103 As Justice Andrews stated in Palsgraf v. Long 
Island Railroad Co.,104 “[w]e may regret that the line was drawn just 
where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be.”105 In Part IV, I will 
propose a workable line that achieves partial justice, but the key point 
 
the negligence rule so that it would efficiently promote deterrence without inefficiently increasing 
the costs of injury compensation. Instead of developing the negligence rule in this manner, 
however, courts have limited duty in order to limit liability for important categories of harms (as 
with most stand-alone emotional and economic harms), thereby inefficiently excluding large 
swaths of social harms from the standard of reasonable care.”). Harold Demsetz described one way 
to think of the phenomenon. Imagine that the actor (here, SoCalGas), owned all the property and 
businesses in the area. SoCalGas would then presumably take into account all the losses that might 
accrue as a result of its activities. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. 347, 355–57 (1967); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115–16 
(1972) (internalizing externalities created by pollution is a frequent goal of nuisance law). 
 101. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881, 892 (Cal. 2019). 
 102. Id. at 894. 
 103. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1049 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(Wisdom, J., dissenting) (“In a sense, any line that the courts draw to limit recovery is arbitrary. 
But this dissent attempts to draw lines which comport more closely with principles of intrinsic 
fairness than the line based on physical damage.”). 
 104.  162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 105. 162 N.E. 99, 103–04 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
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here is simply to note that the court has repeatedly recognized in other 
contexts that administrative difficulties should not stand in the way of 
creating remedies. 
Take, for example, the impediments to recognizing harm caused 
by negligent defendants causing only emotional distress to others. For 
generations, judges resisted claims that emotional injury 
unaccompanied by physical harm should be a recognized category of 
tort.106 However, in the context of negligence, courts began allowing 
compensation for emotional distress parasitic upon physical injury.107 
They also began recognizing liability when the injuries were 
intentionally inflicted.108 Even so, decades passed before jurists 
allowed compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
unaccompanied by physical contact with one’s person.109 The change 
came first for direct victims110 and subsequently for bystanders.111 
 
 106. Lynch v. Knight (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (HL) 863 (“Mental pain or anxiety the law 
cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that 
alone.”); see e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, supra note 76, at 146. 
 107. E.g., Kennedy v. Carriage Cemetery Servs., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934 (D. Nev. 2010) 
(distinguishing “parasitic damages” for emotional harm from damages recoverable in torts for 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress); Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 129 
S.W. 401 (Mo. 1910); see Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law of 
Fright, A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 136, 140–46 (1992). 
 108. See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. 
L. REV. 1033 (1936); William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 
37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939). The American Law Institute’s first Restatement of Torts, published 
in 1934, stated that no recovery for either intentional or negligently inflicted emotional injury was 
allowed unless the defendant’s conduct was independently tortious. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). Yet, according to G. Edward White, Prosser’s Michigan Law 
Review article essentially pulled all the strands together to show how courts were creating a new 
intentional tort of emotional distress. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 102 (2003) (“A major contribution to the ‘creation’ of the ‘new tort’ had 
been made by Prosser himself.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896). In Mitchell v. Rochester 
Ry. Co., a negligently driven team of horses came perilously near the plaintiff, leading her to 
collapse and suffer a miscarriage. Id. at 354. However, because she was not touched by the team, 
the court refused to allow recovery. Id. at 354–55; see also Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972) (rejecting a mother’s claim for emotional distress where a hospital 
employee dropped her baby onto the floor as she looked on because she was unable to establish 
any risk to herself). 
 110. See Robb v. Pa. R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965); Moorhead v. Louisiana, 353 So.2d 
1103, 1105 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (permitting recovery for mental distress caused by plaintiff 
witnessing a bulldozer trespass and remove five trees from her property); 1 DOBBS, HAYDEN & 
BUBLICK, supra note 44, § 309, at 839–40. 
 111.  See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 
1968). 
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In Dillon v. Legg,112 for example, an automobile negligently 
operated by the defendant struck and killed a child while she was 
crossing a street.113 The child’s mother witnessed the child die.114 The 
lower court found that the mother was not herself at risk of injury, and 
dismissed her claim for emotional distress.115 However, despite the 
prevailing worry that recognizing the claim would “open the 
floodgates” to massive numbers of emotional distress suits, the Dillon 
court allowed this “bystander” claim to proceed.116 
In a subsequent decision, Thing v. La Chusa,117 the California 
Supreme Court concluded that bystander claims would be limited in 
the following way: 
1. The plaintiff must be “closely related to the injury victim”; 
2. The plaintiff must be “present at the scene” at the time of the 
injury, and must be aware that the victim is being injured; and 
3. As a result, the plaintiff suffers serious “emotional distress 
beyond which would be” expected of someone not related.118 
In circumscribing emotional distress claims predicated upon a 
negligence cause of action, the California Supreme Court recognized 
that non-relatives might also be seriously affected by seeing someone 
killed in front of them, but determined that some limit on recovery was 
necessary to avoid a plethora of suits.119 
Dissenting in Thing, Justice Broussard criticized the rigid rules 
imposed by the majority as arbitrary, inevitably leading to under-
compensation for profound emotional distress.120 Justice Broussard 
would have allowed recovery to anyone who might foreseeably be 
injured by the defendant’s negligence.121 Even though recoveries for 
emotional distress brought on behalf of bystanders would be restricted 
 
 112. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). Dillon overturned Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 
P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963). In Amaya, a mother saw her seventeen-month-old child run over by a 
negligently operated ice truck. Amaya, 379 P.2d at 514. The California Supreme Court denied 
recovery to the mother since she did not allege that her emotional distress resulted from fear for her 
own safety, i.e., that she was personally in a zone of danger. Id. at 517. 
 113.  Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 915. 
 116. Id.; see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 
22 (5th ed. 1984); Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 463, 494–95 (1998) (discussing judicial concerns about excessive liability). 
 117. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). 
 118. Id. at 814. 
 119.  Id. at 828–29. 
 120. Id. at 841 (Broussard, J., dissenting). 
 121.  Id. at 842–43. 
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by these elements, the court’s jurisprudence has allowed at least some 
relatives to recover instead of barring all claims. 
In the Gas Leak Cases, Justice Cuéllar also expressed concern 
with potential indeterminacy of any incursion on a no-duty rule.122 As 
Professor Jane Stapleton puts it, indeterminacy is the idea that the legal 
system “should refuse to recognize liability where the plaintiff class 
or the quantum that is alleged to be within the scope of the liability are 
so indeterminate that the uncertain scope of threatened liability would 
be intolerably unfair to defendants.”123 Professor Stapleton includes in 
the indeterminacy context what she terms “ripple effects,” the idea that 
a party that suffered economic losses (such as a business) would, in 
turn, not purchase goods from a supplier, which, in turn, would not 
order supplies to produce the good.124 
Professor Stapleton suggests a twofold response to the 
indeterminacy concerns. First, one needs to have a normatively 
justifiable reason to impose economic losses on an actor, and second, 
the boundaries of liability should be relatively ascertainable.125 
To illustrate, Professor Stapleton cites the example of the 
Australian federal court decision in McMullin v. ICI Australia 
Operations Propriety Ltd.,126 where the defendant sold an insecticide 
for use on cotton in a region where cattle grazed on cotton stubble.127 
After ingesting the remnants, the cattle became contaminated by the 
chemical in the insecticide, which led to devastating impact on many 
enterprises reliant on the cattle for their businesses.128 
Several classes of businesses in McMullin that suffered economic 
losses were allowed to bring suit, including the owners of the cattle 
that had fed in the cotton fields, purchasers of the contaminated cattle, 
feedlot operators who did not own any of the offending bovines but 
were required to segregate them at great expense, and others that had 
 
 122. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881, 896 (Cal. 2019) (citing Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)). 
 123. Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle 
Theory”, 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 544 (2002). 
 124. Id. (“Even if the class of victims suffering economic loss as a result of the defendant’s 
negligence is indeterminate, or even if the total economic loss suffered as a result of the negligence 
is indeterminate, there may be a normatively justifiable way to define a class of plaintiffs and a 
class of recoverable loss such that the size of the class and the quantum of recoverable loss are 
ascertainable, meaning that the defendant’s liability is not indeterminate.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. McMullin v. ICI Australia Operations Propriety Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 1 (Austl.).  
 127.  Id. at 2–4. 
 128. Stapleton, supra note 123, at 549. 
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unwittingly purchased meat derived from the cattle.129 However, other 
enterprises that also suffered economic losses—such as cotton waste 
transporters—were not permitted to recover because their losses were 
not found to be directly connected to the contaminated animals.130 
Many businesses that were affected by the contaminated cattle—
including distant dealers who held cattle that could not be sold because 
no prospective buyers could be certain they were not infected—could 
be included in the “normatively justifiable” category.131 However, in 
order to limit recovery to an “ascertainable” group, the McMullin 
decision distinguished those immediately impacted by the infected 
cattle from those who were also harmed, but never came into direct 
contact with the cattle.132  
McMullin can be analogized to the Gas Leak Cases. A 
requirement of normative justification is satisfied by the general tort 
doctrine that one should not be able to shift losses stemming from 
one’s gross negligence onto one’s neighbors, particularly when the 
neighbors have no mechanism of protecting their own interests. 
Because of their proximity to the wellheads, the neighboring 
businesses here were especially vulnerable to the shoddy practices of 
SoCalGas. 
To satisfy a goal of ascertainability, a pragmatic doctrine that 
limits recovery in order to avoid ripple effects of liability beyond 
reasonable boundaries, one needs to identify geographic and temporal 
boundaries to recovery of economic losses. In Part IV, I develop this 
more fully, but the short answer is that pure economic losses in the 
Gas Leak Cases could be fixed geographically and temporally by the 
boundaries of the evacuation zone for the period of time the evacuation 
was in effect. In addition, only those businesses that were themselves 
subject to an evacuation directive could claim “contact” with the 
offending contamination. 
In sum, the fear that courts may not be able to cabin within 
manageable bounds liability for emotional distress has not prevented 
them from recognizing claims in which a negligent defendant 
produced severe consequences for those who were nearby but suffered 
no personal physical injuries. Additionally, courts in other 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132. Id. 
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jurisdictions have dealt with the fear of unmanageability and excessive 
liability in the emotional distress context by creating practical limits 
to who may recover and under what circumstances. While the rules 
limiting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress are 
subject to the critique that they fail to acknowledge how serious 
emotional harms are,133 they can be justified as a pragmatic 
compromise between a no duty rule and a foreseeability rule. 
Similar to the emotional distress context, there are grounds in the 
Gas Leak Cases which would have provided ascertainable limits on 
the recovery of economic losses, and which would have addressed the 
major concerns raised by the court. To that alternative I will now turn. 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC LOSSES INVOLVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS 
There was another possibility available to the court in the Gas 
Leak Cases that would have granted relief to the plaintiffs and paved 
the way for a significant and important reevaluation of the pure 
economic loss rule in stranger cases. The inklings of that alternative 
possibility can be found not only in the trial court’s ruling and other 
important federal decisions affecting California but also in the 
California Supreme Court’s own precedents. 
A. Complete Disruption of Business Activities by Grossly 
Culpable Actors Causing “Particular Damage” 
In overruling SoCalGas’s demurrer, the trial court held that the 
economic loss rule did not apply to bar the negligence-based claims in 
this case.134 In Judge Wiley’s view, 
[t]he economic loss rule . . . does not apply in a context like 
this one: a classic mass tort action where high transactions 
costs precluded transactions, where the risk of harm was 
foreseeable and was closely connected with [SoCalGas’s] 
conduct, where damages were not wholly speculative, and 
where the injury was not part of the plaintiff’s ordinary 
business risk.135 
 
 133. See Chamallas, supra note 116. 
 134. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 119 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 
441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019).  
 135. Id. at 120. 
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In other words, can the economic losses suffered by these neighboring 
businesses be distinguished from losses suffered by the illustration 
involving highway drivers? Judge Wiley thought so, and I do too. 
In Judge Wiley’s view, there is a difference between negligence 
that affects people’s lives momentarily, or that merely involves 
increased costs or ordinary business risks, and negligence that causes 
an environmental disaster that completely disrupts an entire 
community and the businesses within that community. By “ordinary 
business risk,” Judge Wiley may have considered the reciprocal risks 
auto drivers expose each other to on the highway and the delays caused 
by casual negligence backing up traffic, or the risk that a fire in the 
neighborhood might close down a business for a day.136 If so, those 
ordinary business risks are not ones for which a negligent defendant 
would be held responsible. However, mass tort cases present a 
different scenario requiring a different approach to economic losses. 
In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,137 commercial fishermen sought 
damages for their prospective loss of fishing profits resulting from an 
oil spill in the Santa Barbara channel caused by an oil company’s 
negligence in maintaining an oil rig.138 Operating under a stipulation 
in which both parties agreed that the fishermen would be granted only 
such damages as would be available under California tort law,139 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendants owed a duty 
to the fishermen “to refrain from negligent conduct in their drilling 
operations, which conduct reasonably and foreseeably could have 
been anticipated to cause a diminution of the aquatic life in the Santa 
Barbara Channel area and thus cause injury to the plaintiffs’ 
business.”140 The court noted that the fishermen’s loss should be 
allocated to the party who could best prevent the loss, which was 
obviously the defendant oil company.141 
 
 136. See id.; Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903). 
 137. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 138. Id. at 558.  
 139. The Gas Leak Cases opinion attempted to distinguish Union Oil as a paean to seamen, a 
“favorite” of admiralty law. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d at 891. However, even 
though the oil spill occurred in navigable waters, the Ninth Circuit was led by both parties in their 
stipulation to apply California tort law to the problem. Indeed, in the first part of the opinion, Judge 
Sneed concludes that the law of California applied to the case either directly, or because an 
admiralty court would borrow California law to decide the case. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 562–63. 
 140. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 566; see Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 
1981). But see Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 141. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 569. 
(8) 53.2_NOCKLEBY (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020  12:40 PM 
436 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:409 
The Union Oil court recognized that it was creating an exception 
to the economic loss rule, for the fishermen had suffered no physical 
injuries or property damage, and the destruction of aquatic life 
consisted “merely” of ecological disaster since the oceans and their 
seafaring occupants are not “property.”142 But the entire livelihoods of 
the commercial fishermen were destroyed, at least for a time, and the 
court determined that the defendants owed a duty to them to avoid 
negligent diminution of aquatic life.143 
Notably, the Union Oil court was careful to say that its ruling 
would not necessarily extend to other parties suffering pure economic 
loss.144 We can imagine a cascade of potential economic harm losses: 
the dockworkers and businesses that receive the fishing vessels’ 
catches and process them for sale, delivery vehicles devoted to 
distribution, and the restaurants that must obtain replacement seafood. 
One way to distinguish among these other businesses might be to ask: 
which businesses were directly and specially injured by the 
destruction of the fisheries? Surely the docks and businesses that 
received the fish should also be included in the realm of businesses 
able to recover since their livelihoods were completely dependent on 
the fishing vessels. The nearby restaurants that solely served fish from 
the nearby sea should also arguably have standing, but their standing 
may also depend on whether they have the capacity to receive 
alternative sources of fish. 
Yet Union Oil hinted at what, in the court’s view, distinguished 
the fishermen from other businesses.145 As Herbert Bernstein put it 
 
 142. Id. at 568. “I am amazed at the publicity for the loss of a few birds,” Union Oil president 
Fred Hartley infamously said after the spill. Kate Wheeling & Max Ufberg, ‘The Ocean Is Boiling’: 
The Complete Oral History of the 1969 Santa Barbara Oil Spill, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://psmag.com/news/the-ocean-is-boiling-the-complete-oral-history-of-the-1969-santa-
barbara-oil-spill. Wild fish are not property, at least not until they are captured. See Pierson v. Post, 
3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer 
Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 
ENVTL. L. 673, 684–90 (2005) (analyzing the history of wildlife appropriation in early America). 
 143.  Of course, the commercial fishermen would still be required to prove their injuries in 
subsequent proceedings. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 570. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Dissenting in Testbank, Judge Wisdom would not have limited recovery in Union Oil to 
just the fishermen: 
Certainly the injury from the oil spill to others who make their living upon the water, 
such as boat charterers who are unable to put to sea, is as foreseeable and as direct as the 
injury to the fishermen. It is therefore unclear why these parties should not also be 
entitled to recovery. The court did attempt to distinguish fishermen in that they “lawfully 
and directly make use of a resource of the sea, viz. its fish, in the ordinary course of their 
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two decades ago, “[t]he answer may be that it makes a difference 
whether the interference with a use of resources effectively shuts down 
a business, at least temporarily, or just increases the costs of running 
a business.”146 Using this lens, what enables the businesses that 
receive the catch to recover is that they lose out entirely; whereas the 
restaurant that can secure alternative sources of supply has its costs 
increased, but is not solely dependent on the catch of the day. 
Bernstein’s distinction may help sort the environmental disaster 
from the traffic accident: is a business incidentally delayed or 
diminished, or does it face overwhelming loss as a result of a 
defendant’s negligence? Enterprises that face major loss of business 
as a result of an environmental disaster stand in a different position 
than those that experience a short-term delay, or an increase in costs, 
or that may, in Judge Wiley’s words, suffer “ordinary business 
risk.”147 
If the destruction of a business resulting from a defendant’s 
negligence that is neither within the realm of reciprocal risk nor 
ordinary business risk defines a principle that cabins economic losses 
within a manageable sphere, the remaining question is whether the 
business plaintiffs in the Gas Leak Cases can offer a meaningful 
geographic and temporal distinction between their situation and that 
of other businesses located many miles away. In this case, the public 
health agencies provide a ready limitation: the five-mile evacuation 
zone during the four months until the gas leak was capped. 
Justice Cuéllar was dismissive of the significance of the 
evacuation zone, finding it hard to distinguish between the business 
located 4.9 miles from the leak and one located 5.1 miles away.148 In 
 
business”. Yet, if those who make use of a “resource of the sea” are entitled to recovery, 
then it seems a fortiori that those who make use of the sea itself in their business-a boat 
charterer, for example-would be entitled to recovery. 
Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1035, 1044 n.23 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 146. Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46 
AM. J. COMP. L. 112, 131 (1998). 
 147. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 120 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 
441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019). 
 148. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881, 892 (Cal. 2019). Justice Cuéllar also 
noted that the authorities eventually extended the geographic evacuation zone beyond the five-mile 
radius. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d at 892–93. In my view, wherever public 
health authorities draw the evacuation zone involving environmental disasters circumscribes the 
businesses that, provided they suffer significant business disruption, would have standing to bring 
suit for their economic losses. 
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his view, both may have suffered comparable economic losses and 
both should be treated the same. 
Such an argument may have superficial appeal, yet, as Justice 
Holmes reminds us, drawing lines is the business of law.149 The fact 
that an attentive driver violates a 55 mph speed limit by operating her 
vehicle at 56 mph, yet an inattentive driver proceeding at 54 mph is 
not sanctioned, simply recognizes that a line must be drawn 
somewhere to protect the public from undue risk created by speeding 
vehicles. 
Moreover, to deny all recovery when it is difficult to justify 
differential treatment of entities on either side of a particular line does 
not make sense. Here, the Porter Ranch business located 5.1 miles 
away did not have to relocate or evacuate, nor did customers living 
nearby but on the distant side of the leak. Perhaps the 5.1-mile 
business also suffered, or alternatively, perhaps its operations saw 
increased activity because people were reluctant to enter the 
evacuation zone to conduct business. 
More importantly, the fact that some injured businesses would not 
recover their losses does not justify denying businesses that can 
demonstrate significant destruction of their income during the 
evacuation period the possibility of recovery. If a line must be drawn 
somewhere, that line wherever drawn will permit some enterprises to 
recover while denying recovery to others who may also be harmed. 
Let’s not forget that the line wherever drawn is established for 
pragmatic reasons, not for reasons of justice. 
By analogy, in the emotional distress cases, the fact that the 
California Supreme Court restricts bystander recovery to close 
relatives means that cousins who grew up together, or aunts and 
uncles, or even best friends who see their loved one killed in front of 
them, will not be able to recover for their admittedly serious emotional 
distress. Meanwhile, the parent who paid little attention to the child 
when she was alive is permitted standing to sue. Everyone 
acknowledges that this rule is not “fair”: non-immediate relatives or 
 
 149. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925) (Holmes, J.) (“[W]here to draw the line . . . is the 
question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law.”); see generally Frederick Schauer, 
Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 369–73 (1985) (analyzing linguistic difficulties inherent in 
drawing lines). In a different context, Lee Bollinger criticizes an argument that points out that 
invoking instances on either side of a legal line can always be shown to be problematic: “[It] is one 
of the most beguiling methods of obfuscation and diversion in legal argumentation . . . .” See LEE 
C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 35–39 (1986). 
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dear friends who can establish a close relationship with a decedent 
surely are as deserving of recovery as the distant parent. Yet courts 
and commentators justify the line on the pragmatic ground that it must 
be drawn somewhere to avoid limitless liability and liability 
disproportionate to the wrong. 
In ruling against the plaintiffs here, Justice Cuéllar relied on the 
Guste v. M/V Testbank150 case, a leading case reflecting a 
conservative, bright-line approach to the problem of economic loss. In 
the summer of 1980, two container ships collided on the Mississippi 
River, resulting in hazardous chemicals, including hydrobromic acid, 
forming a dense fog overhead and approximately twelve tons of 
pentachlorophenol (PCP) spilling overboard and polluting the 
navigation channel.151 This was the largest such spill in United States 
history.152 The Coast Guard closed the outlet to navigation for three 
weeks.153 “[A]ll fishing, shrimping, and related activit[ies] [were] 
temporarily suspended in the outlet and the surrounding four hundred 
square miles of marsh and waterways.”154 
“[S]hipping interests, marina and boat rental operators, wholesale 
and retail seafood [outlets] . . . , seafood restaurants, [and] tackle and 
bait shops” brought suit seeking recovery for their economic losses.155 
None claimed that they had suffered losses because the chemicals 
themselves injured their property. Hearing the case en banc, a majority 
of the Fifth Circuit judges determined that a “bright line rule” of “no 
duty” to avoid pure economic losses should prevail.156 “The bright line 
rule of damage to a proprietary interest, as most, has the virtue of 
predictability with the vice of creating results in cases at its edge that 
are said to be ‘unjust’ or ‘unfair.’”157 
Dissenting in Testbank, Judge John Minor Wisdom argued that 
the court’s rule “[was] out of step with contemporary tort doctrine 
[and] works substantial injustice on innocent victims.”158 Judge 
Wisdom urged adoption of a different limitation on recovery for 
economic loss, requiring that plaintiffs seeking compensation not only 
 
 150. 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 151. Id. at 1020.  
 152. Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. at 1020–21.   
 156. Id. at 1028.  
 157. Id. at 1029. 
 158. Id. at 1035 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
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show they are foreseeably damaged by the defendants’ negligence, but 
in addition establish that they are “particularly damaged,” an element 
gleaned from the public nuisance line of cases.159 
“Particular damages” are those different in kind and degree from 
those suffered by the general public.160 When a river or commercial 
artery is blocked, for example, boats or vehicles that utilized the public 
way would be able to recover their additional expenses to navigate the 
transportation.161 Judge Wisdom recognized that although his 
approach “requires a case-by-case analysis, it comports with the 
fundamental idea of fairness that innocent plaintiffs should receive 
compensation and negligent defendants should bear the cost of their 
tortious acts.”162 
It’s true that a bright line “no duty” rule of the court here and the 
majority in Testbank has the virtue of being clear in the same way that 
any immunity rule does: by rejecting any opportunity to show how a 
defendant’s negligence caused great harm to the economy of a 
community. Justness and fairness are the victims of such a clear rule 
that forecloses responsibility for economic losses. 
The fact that negligent ship operators in Testbank can operate to 
shut down navigation for three weeks on a major artery, and that the 
defendants in that case and the Gas Leak Cases can destroy the 
livelihoods of many other economic actors in the area of the disaster, 
creates a perverse incentive to continue shipping hazardous chemicals 
on the waterway or storing gas underneath urban areas. The 
beneficiaries of the shipment or storage of the hazardous materials 
escape responsibility for the costs of such activities that create great 
harm, and innocent businesses—local businesses in the Gas Leak 
Cases and shrimpers, seafood purveyors, and other businesses in 
transportation in Testbank—end up bearing the loss. 
 
 159. Id. at 1046–51 (“Those parties who are foreseeably and proximately injured by an oil spill 
or closure of a navigable river, for example, and who can also prove damages that are beyond the 
general economic dislocation that attends such disasters should recover whether or not they had 
contractual dealings with others who were also damaged by the tortious act.”). 
 160. Id. at 1047. 
 161. Id. at 1048–49; see, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) 
(denying motion to dismiss claims of fishermen and clam diggers seeking damages as a result of 
an oil spill in a Maine bay because those plaintiffs suffered particular “damage different in kind, 
rather than simply in degree, from that sustained by the public generally”), aff’d, 559 F.2d 1200 
(1st Cir. 1977); Pharr v. Morgan’s L. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 38 So. 943, 944 (La. 1905) (allowing a 
steamboat operator to recover additional costs of leasing smaller vessels when the defendant 
damaged a bridge to such a degree that the steamboat could not pass underneath). 
 162. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1035 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, the bright line rule adopted in these cases for 
administrative convenience obscures the role that judges play in 
deciding cases. As then-Professor Kathleen Sullivan explained, hard-
and-fast “rules favor the judicial abdication of responsibility, while 
standards make the judge face up to his choices—he cannot absolve 
himself by saying ‘sorry, my hands are tied.’ On this view, [case by 
case adjudication] make visible and accountable the inevitable 
weighing process that rules obscure.”163 
In sum, Judge Wisdom’s proposed limitation on recovery of 
economic losses, that the plaintiff’s loss be “particularly damaged,” 
provides a means to distinguish routine business risk from the kind of 
unique harm present both here and in Testbank. The shrimpers, 
clamdiggers, and seafood purveyors in Testbank, unable to carry on 
their business during the weeks that the four-hundred square-mile ban 
was in effect, should be able to recover their losses. Similarly, the 
businesses in the Gas Leak Cases that were within the five-mile 
evacuation zone and suffered loss for the four-month period of the 
evacuation should be able to recover for those losses. 
Although the businesses in the Gas Leak Cases might have sought 
lost business profits for the period beyond the four-month evacuation 
period, I would not allow recovery of those losses because they are not 
reflective of particular damages associated with the ongoing discharge 
of the gas. While the gas leak might have caused diminution of 
business for a longer time than the four-month evacuation period, the 
evacuation timeframe provides a ready means of distinguishing the 
evacuation businesses’ losses from those outside the evacuation zone 
and timeframe. Again, as in the emotional distress context, the lines 
that are drawn achieve a partial justice but are limited by pragmatic 
considerations. 
New Jersey courts have analyzed several cases that illustrate how 
a “particular damage” rule might function in practice. In In re 
Paulsboro Derailment Cases,164 a freight train operated by the 
 
 163. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 67 
(1992); see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 104 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–1713 (1976); Pierre Schlag, 
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379–430 (1985). Ironically, Sullivan argued the case 
for Southern California Edison.   
 164. No. 13-784-RBK-KMW, 2015 WL 3545247 (D.N.J. June 8, 2015). 
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defendant railroad derailed over a bridge, and at least one of four tank 
cars carrying vinyl chloride leaked into the air and water.165 
The plaintiffs, several schools operated by a municipality, alleged 
the defendants were negligent in operating the train and the bridge.166 
Because of the derailment, public health officials ordered the schools 
to be closed, “amounting to a loss of six days of curricular instruction 
valued at approximately $134,223 per day.”167 In a related case, 
“plaintiffs were individuals and businesses who incurred expenses and 
lost income as a result of the evacuation and shelter-in-place orders 
issued by the Borough after the derailment.”168 The district court judge 
found that both groups of plaintiffs satisfied the “particular 
foreseeability” requirement of New Jersey courts when considering 
whether economic losses should be recoverable.169 
The leading case in New Jersey, People Express Airlines, Inc. v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp.,170 set forth a rule that allowed for recovery 
of economic losses.171 A fire ignited in a railroad’s freight yard “when 
ethylene oxide . . . escaped from a tank car[] [and] punctured during a 
‘coupling’ operation with another rail car.”172 “[M]unicipal authorities 
. . . evacuated the area within a one-mile radius surrounding the fire,” 
including the local office of an airline, “to lessen the risk to persons 
within the area should the burning tank car explode.”173 “Although the 
feared explosion never occurred,” and the plaintiff’s physical property 
was not affected, the plaintiff’s employees were prohibited from 
entering their business for twelve hours, and the airline sought 
compensation from the negligent defendants responsible for the leak 
and fire.174 In allowing the case to survive a motion to dismiss, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court required the plaintiff airline to establish 
that it was a member of a distinctive class “in terms of the type of 
persons or entities comprising the class, the certainty or predictability 
of their presence, the approximate numbers of those in the class, as 
 
 165. Id. at *1.  
 166.  Id. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at *3. 
 169. Id. 
 170. 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985). 
 171. Id. at 115–16. 
 172. Id. at 108.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at 108–09. 
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well as the type of economic expectations disrupted.”175 Whereas 
“members of the general public . . . or persons travelling on a highway 
near the scene of a negligently-caused accident . . . [may be] 
foreseeable.”176  However, no duty would be owed to them because 
“their presence within the area would be fortuitous, and the particular 
type of economic injury . . . unpredictable and not realistically 
foreseeable.”177 Thus, the plaintiff would have to distinguish itself 
from the larger community or random passersby that might also have 
suffered delay in their travels, or who might have been temporarily 
inconvenienced by the defendants’ negligence. 
A further illustration of how a “particular damage” principle 
might be applied is suggested by 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, 
Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc.178 In that case, a section of 540 Madison 
Avenue, a thirty-nine-story office tower located in Manhattan, 
partially collapsed.179 “[B]ricks, mortar and other material fell onto 
Madison Avenue at 55th Street, a prime commercial location.”180 The 
city closed off several blocks to foot traffic, and a twenty-four-hour 
delicatessen, a half block away, had to remain closed for five weeks.181 
Although the New York Court of Appeals held that the 
delicatessen suffered injuries that were the same in kind as those 
suffered by all of the businesses in the community,182 this conclusion 
seems wrong. The deli’s injuries are surely unique: not all businesses 
in Manhattan suffered equally, and if a business was required by city 
officials to close for five weeks on account of the defendant’s 
negligence, those injuries provide a ready means of distinguishing the 
deli’s losses from those outside the closure zone. The five-week 
shutdown also provides a ready means of establishing an articulable 
time limit on the running of damages. 
What was undoubtedly on the New York Court of Appeals’ 
collective mindset is the fear of imposing indeterminate liability that 
has no end. However, if the Finlandia Center’s negligence created 
such risk of further injury, surely the disruption to nearby businesses 
 
 175. Id. at 116. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. (emphasis added). 
 178. 750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 2001). 
 179. Id. at 1099.  
 180. Id.  
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 1103.  
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affected by road closure can be distinguished from losses outside the 
closure zone. It’s not at all clear to me why a negligent defendant 
should not have to provide compensation to the businesses so 
distinctly affected by the road closure. 
In short, caselaw at present seems to be open to providing 
compensation to the single owner whose business is disrupted, but not 
when hundreds or thousands of businesses are disrupted by a 
defendant’s negligence. The striking feature of this result seems to 
protect the grossly negligent defendant who causes great disruption 
from being held responsible for the losses it causes. 
B. Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
In the Gas Leak Cases, there are additional reasons to allow the 
plaintiffs to seek their economic losses. As urged above, the evidence 
is compelling that the operation of the Aliso Canyon Storage Facility 
is an abnormally dangerous activity. The court has yet to consider 
whether economic losses suffered by those maintaining such an 
activity create a different circumstance than a cause of action based on 
simple negligence.183 This case did not decide whether the rule 
limiting economic losses extends beyond a cause of action based on 
negligence.184 
Confining the analysis to negligence duty, as here, leaves for 
another day consideration of alternative theories of potential liability. 
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged a theory of strict liability 
based on the defendants’ conduct of an abnormally dangerous 
activity.185 In addition, the complaint discloses significant wrongdoing 
that in my view would have supported a finding of gross negligence, 
recklessness, and potentially even willful and wanton behavior by the 
utility—the latter of which would have supported a punitive damage 
award at least on behalf of governmental entities as well as persons 
 
 183. Oscar Gray gives the example of economic loss in a strict liability context: where 
trespassing non-pure-bred livestock impregnate purebred breeding stock diminishing the value of 
the female, the owner is entitled to compensation for this loss of value. See Gray, supra note 44, at 
900; see also Fuchser v. Jacobson, 290 N.W.2d 449 (Neb. 1980) (recognizing same result in either 
negligence or strict liability); Hall v. Umiker, 209 N.W.2d 361 (S.D. 1973) (strict liability). 
 184. Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881, 883 (Cal. 2019) (“So the claims before 
us are best not treated as compensable in negligence.”). 
 185.  Southern California Gas Leak Cases, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 120 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d 
441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019). 
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who may have suffered personal injury. Yet the court’s analysis 
considers only a theory of recovery based upon simple negligence. 
In addition to the analysis suggested above, distinguishing among 
causes of action may provide an alternative route for a future court. If 
the utility’s activity, storing eighty billion cubic feet of natural gas in 
huge underground reservoirs underneath residential communities, is 
indeed an abnormally dangerous activity, then perhaps economic 
losses resulting from such activities should be treated differently than 
economic losses resulting from simple negligence. In this case, 
deciding on the pleadings based on simple negligence truncated any 
such analysis. 
If the utility here could be shown to have acted in a grossly 
negligent or reckless manner, that would create additional justification 
for recognizing economic losses on the part of defendants risking 
substantial environmental and economic dislocation by their activities. 
If a defendant’s operation is so deficient (as even the limited facts 
reveal here) as to amount to willful disregard of the ecological and 
economic health of the neighboring community, a standard that would 
prevent recovery for economic losses surely would treat the defendant 
as a favorite of the law instead of the gross wrongdoer it seems to be. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In every generation, new challenges to common law doctrines 
arise. Burgeoning technologies, in a society that seems at every 
moment to create one or another environmental disaster, must be 
controlled. Some of those disasters affect the stability and security of 
the planet or undermine the economic security of a community. Courts 
faced with cases such as the Gas Leak Cases should recognize that a 
different dimension of risk-taking by grossly negligent defendants 
requires a different level of analysis than what is applied to a routine 
auto accident that merely inconveniences others but does not destroy 
their livelihoods for months on-end. 
In this case, the worst natural gas leak in the history of the 
country, the California Supreme Court—burdened by nineteenth and 
twentieth century worries—had an opportunity to set the law of 
economic losses on a new path, one that recognized the harm and its 
extent caused by negligence of those in charge of extremely dangerous 
enterprises. But, despite having a reasonable alternative route, the 
court chose to reject a needed reform of doctrine. An alternative that 
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would have recognized claims of pure economic losses by these 
businesses, carefully circumscribed by the evacuation zone for the 
four-month period of the evacuation, would have achieved a greater 
measure of justice, and would have required the negligent operator to 
internalize some of the additional burdens the community suffered. 
More challenges to the economic loss doctrine will come as new 
technologies arise and global warming changes the calculus of risk. 
Law that may have been adequate at one time may prove incapable of 
creating sufficient incentives to control the risks of future disasters. 
When courts limit recovery to just those who suffered personal 
injury or property damage but not destruction of the livelihoods of 
businesses equally affected, as here, it limits the capacity of the system 
to force enterprises to internalize the true costs of not paying attention 
to the disaster-in-the-making. When the economic loss rule is applied 
to baleful conduct as evidenced here by SoCalGas, it permits that 
company to escape without paying anywhere near the full cost of its 
negligence, and thereby undermines the incentive structure provided 
by tort law. 
When entities control the levers of enormous destructive power— 
power that can destroy communities and contaminate the 
environment—limiting damages as the California Supreme Court did 
in this case is truly unfortunate. We should be asking: does the 
economic loss doctrine as applied in this case serve justice? 
